Abstract: The monetary valuation of ecosystem services is gaining traction in policy and
nidades políticas y de negocios. Se han propuesto varias herramientas y procesos de toma de decisiones, incluyendo criterios para evaluar la pertinencia del uso de las tasaciones monetarias para los resultados de la conservación de la biodiversidad. Estos criterios incorporan medidas como la escala, la naturalezaúnica, y la amenaza. Utilizamos estudios de caso de proyectos de monetización en los cuales los resultados fueron medidos para explorar las limitaciones y la aplicación de dichos criterios. La evidencia de la efectividad de dichos esquemas fue limitada. La mayoría de los esquemas estuvieron establecidos enáreas en las que el criterio excluía específicamente su uso en aislamiento. Por esto, aunque algunos aspectos de la monetización pueden ser benéficos para la conservación de la biodiversidad, estos esquemas no se usaban correctamente y requieren de medidas cuantitativas mínimas (o máximas) que se apliquen en medidas adicionales de política o de governanza para asegurar los resultados de la conservación de la biodiversidad.
Palabras Clave: biodiversidad, conservación, estudios de caso, pago, tasación
: , , , ,
Introduction
Traditionally, tools to assess the effectiveness of conservation policies focus on ecological aspects of policy compliance. Such tools include environmental impact assessments of habitat loss (Gontier et al. 2006 ) and biodiversity assessments (Hayek & Buzas 2010) . However, due to the increasing importance of sustainability principles in conservation, it is now widely recognized that any decision-making tool should include aspects of economic development and social equity. It has been argued that the use of valuation may alienate some stakeholders and cannot fully reconcile cultural, economic, social, and environmental justice problems (Matulis 2014; Tallis & Lubchenco 2014) and that such approaches are complex and involve conflicts (Kenter 2016; Pascual et al. 2017) . However, the benefits to people of ecosystem services and how they can be valued has become an integral part of decision making (Costanza et al. 1998 (Costanza et al. , 2017 Adams 2014) . Economic valuation of natural resources was first applied in the 1980s (Mitchell & Carson 1989; Pagiola 2008) and several frameworks have been developed since for valuations of ecosystems (Bagstad et al. 2013; Costanza et al. 2017) . A main benefit of such techniques is that they improve and facilitate discussions on conservation at the scientific and policy levels (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005; Kallis et al. 2013; Ruckelshaus et al. 2015) because they allow environmental contributions and the consequences of their preservation, loss, or restoration to be expressed in terms comparable to other aspects relevant to land-use choices (Hanley & Shogren 2002; Randall 2002) .
There are concerns regarding the applicability and challenges of valuation (Adams 2014) . Interdependent ecosystems and ecosystem services are difficult to value in monetary terms (Vatn & Bromley 1994; Gómez-Baggethun & Ruiz-Pérez 2011) or to value separately due to their inherent complexity (Rodriguez et al. 2006; Martín-López et al. 2008) . Equally, there is a high degree of uncertainty about the role and importance of specific parts of ecosystems and their functions (Farley 2008) . Here, uncertainty characterizes the unknown probabilities of possible outcomes and is different from risk, which describes known probabilities of possible outcomes.
Valuations often rely on economic assumptions that apply normative judgments (Abson & Termansen 2010) . Markets often weight preferences by purchasing power (Farley et al. 2015) and are influenced by the power structures within and between the institutions in which they exist (Vatn & Bromley 1994; Martinez-Alier & O'Connor 2002; Røpke 2005) . Similarly, local-scale studies are influenced by individual characteristics and perceptions, such as the level of place attachment (Garcia-Llorente et al. 2012; Lopez-Mosquera & Sanchez 2013) and personal environmental values (Spash et al. 2009; Lopez-Mosquera & Sanchez 2012) . In this context, some argue for a plural valuation approach, referring to the consideration of monetary values and ecological, social, and cultural values (e.g., de Groot et al. 2006; Kumar 2010; Norgaard 2010) . There is evidence that valuation may adversely affect pro-environmental behaviors through the reduction in the intrinsic value of nature (Goff et al. 2017) .
Several authors propose certain conditions under which valuation studies can be useful especially on a policy level for nature conservation. Kallis et al. (2013) propose 4 criteria be used to guide the decision on whether to value nature (Table 1) . Although additionality is an objective criterion, Kallis et al. (2013) apply equality, complexity blinding, and accumulation by dispossession as normative criteria.
Other normative criteria that need to be considered include whether an ecosystem is publicly or privately managed (Lockie 2013 ) and the source of funding for ecosystem valuation (Mokhiber 1999) . Objective criteria include specific ecological conditions, level of substitutability of the ecosystem (Ekins et al. 2003; Turner et al. 2003) , and level of ecological resilience (Brand 2009) . The scale at which these measurements should be taken is debated. Some favor local measurements (Turner et al. 2003; Ninan & Inoue 2013) because they are more focused and adjustable to the conditions of the ecosystem than large-scale programs . Global ecosystem assessments show that some important thresholds have been exceeded (Rockstrom et al. 2009 ). Turner et al. (2003) propose that the ability of ecosystems to be valued depends substantially on the scale of change. Small-scale ecosystem changes (e.g., loss of a small forest) can be meaningfully valued, whereas for global, largescale changes that have severe consequences for human life or that affect ecosystems that are not substitutable meaningful valuation may not be possible. This argument is bolstered by a demand curve of the flow of ecosystem services. If the provision of ecosystem services falls below a critical threshold, then it is no longer possible to value it meaningfully because further losses would result in the unviability of that ecosystem service and therefore its ultimate destruction. Determining which change will have relatively little effect is one of the main challenges of valuation. In small-scale valuation studies of a comprehensive set of ecosystem functions and uses, valuation shows that conservation relative to conversion is economically more beneficial (Turner et al. 2003) . Farley (2008) integrated the concept of critical natural capital (Ekins et al. 2003) , which is not substitutable and essential to human life, into this framework. He proposes that abundant and resilient stocks of critical natural capital are appropriate to be valued and that stocks of natural capital close to a critical threshold should not be valued because of increasing uncertainties and their growing marginal importance (Fig. 1) . Farley [2008] and Turner et al. [2003] ).
Farley (2008) agrees with Turner et al. (2003) that valuation can, at least theoretically, inform the decision regarding the degree to which ecosystems should be conserved, but he mentions that in reality the market fails to allocate environmental goods. Especially for the global ecosystem, which is not far from threshold, valuation cannot be applied as a solution for the macroallocation problem. Daly et al. (2007) suggests ecosystem-service prices should adjust to demand regulated by conservation, and not the other way around. When these minimum requirements are met, an eventual surplus may be converted to economic production. Here, valuation may help achieve these conservation requirements in the most cost-efficient way (Farley 2008) and bring attention to the problem (Costanza et al. 1998) .
Significant emphasis has been given to the design of valuation tools. However, the condition of the ecosystem service being valued is equally crucial to the decision of whether ecosystem valuation can be applied effectively and meaningfully. Therefore, we studied what theory suggests are appropriate ecosystem services to be valued through monetization and examined whether actual use of valuation is in line with what theory suggests.
Methods
We searched Google Scholar to compile a list of potential case studies. Each case study needed to include a valuation method and to have considered ecosystems that had been directly affected or were about to be affected by human intervention that would result in ecosystem change. In addition, case studies needed to include evaluations of the environmental effectiveness of the valuation method in protecting the underlying ecosystem service. These evaluations were used to categorize the case studies as positive, negative, or mixed. Schemes for which the valuation method had little or no impact on the environmental outcomes (even if the environmental outcomes were positive overall) were categorized as negative, and those that required additional conservation measures to ensure positive outcomes were categorized as mixed. We included case studies for which the evaluation was conducted independent of the organizations involved in the ecosystem payments, either making or receiving the payments. Relative to valuation studies, case studies on the actual outcomes of implementation of ecosystemservice valuations are rare (Laurans et al. 2013 ). Assessing whether a program effectively protected the ecosystem was not straightforward because defining the counterfactual and assessing long-term effectiveness of new programs were difficult. Linked to the need for a counterfactual, measuring effectiveness necessitates measuring additionality.
We allocated each case study to 1 of 3 common types of monetization: payments for ecosystem services (PES), integration of ecosystem service valuation in cost-benefit analyses (CBA), and compensation payments for environmental damages. Payments for ecosystem services involved monetary exchange between 2 or more parties to prevent or lessen damage to a particular ecosystem. Costbenefit analyses involved one party integrating a monetary value for a given ecosystem service into a decision
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When ecosystem-service valuations are implemented in PES schemes, they are usually approximated by the opportunity cost of providing the services rather than by their inherent value . For CBA and compensation payments a variety of valuation methods are applied, including benefit transfer, which extrapolates valuation studies for other locations or times as approximation for the value of the ecosystem in question (Reid 1999; Turner et al. 2003; Schmidt & Wittich 2014) , and contingent valuation, which examines the value people would pay to avoid the loss of an ecosystem service (i.e., Carson et al. 2003) .
Some damage-compensation payments case studies included passive-use values measured by people's willingness to pay to prevent further environmental catastrophes (Mueller & de Groot 2016) . Some case studies used benefit transfer and extrapolated valuations of other ecosystems, such as cost-benefit analyses (Reid 1999; Schmidt & Wittich 2014) . The PES schemes valued ecosystem services through flexible market interactions, such as tendering where landowners offer the provision of certain ecosystem services for a certain price (Shelton & Whitten 2005) ; approximations of the payee's opportunity costs and design of uniform payments based on this (Pagiola 2008) ; or individualized payment schemes (Asquith et al. 2008 ). Applied to PES schemes, undifferentiated payments were counted as large-scale valuations, whereas payment contracts made individually for every farm were regarded as local valuations.
In each case study, we used the criteria outlined below to determine whether an ecosystem service should be valued. We applied Turner et al.'s (2003) suggestion that ecosystems that are not substitutable for moral reasons, which adds a normative dimension to the other rather objective criteria, or are not substitutable because their degradation would entail severe consequences for human survival are not appropriate to be valued. This includes valuing ecosystems of global extent. Ecosystems on a local scale subject to minimal change in condition can be valued meaningfully as long as they are not close to a threshold beyond which the existence of the ecosystem is threatened. If an ecosystem is close to this threshold, their state is highly uncertain making it inappropriate for valuation (Farley 2008) . Accordingly, we applied the criteria scale of change, level of threat, and uniqueness to determine the appropriateness of valuation. Although it is difficult to define the uniqueness of an ecosystem, it is possible to approximate the global role an ecosystem plays based on its relative substitutability. The criticality of the ecosystems valued is approximated by these criteria and a judgment on whether in practice the ecosystems are appropriate to be valued on theoretical grounds can be made. If the ecosystem does not fulfill one of these 3 criteria, it should only be valued under restrictions. Based on this scheme, we assigned the case studies to 1 of 3 levels of criticality of the ecosystem service ( Fig. 1 ). Monetization or valuation should be applied only to ecosystems in a noncritical state that can provide abundant ecosystem services. Ecosystems in this first level (level I) are not threatened, not unique, and not globally important. If an ecosystem meets 1 or 2 of these criteria, some quantitative limit has to be applied to safeguard the sustainable minimum standard of the ecosystem or ecosystem service (Farley 2008) . These ecosystems represent the middle level (level II). The cases that fulfilled none of the criteria were assigned to the region where valuation is impossible (level III) because their value is infinite and their restoration or conservation is critical (Farley 2008) . We concentrated on ecological criticality, although we are aware that criticality can be the result of other than ecological characteristics.
Results

Valuation Methods
The 21 case studies we evaluated covered a range of methods for the valuation of ecosystem services (Table 2) . Most ecosystem-service valuation approaches were PES schemes (15 case studies). Three cost-benefit analyses and 3 compensation payment schemes were also examined. Five had positive environmental outcomes, 6 had mixed outcomes, and 10 had negative outcomes.
Scale of Change
The case studies covered a wide range of spatial scales, from 288 to 21 million ha (Bertke & Marggraf 2005; Liu et al. 2008 ) (median 28,000 ha) ( Table 2) . Five of the studies included an element of or were wholly related to carbon sequestration and could therefore be considered global in scale. In the sample, some studies valued one certain ecosystem or similar ecosystems in one region (e.g., the region surrounding a watershed or catchment area [Wunder & Albán 2008; Asquith et al. 2008; Schmidt & Wittich 2014] ), whereas others valued different types of ecosystems simultaneously.
The largest valuation scheme where aggregated valuation made at a uniform price was used is the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). Auctions under the EU ETS are generally uniform-price auctions and allocate large amounts of allowances for the same market clearing price. For example, on 14 September 2017, 5,329,500 allowances were auctioned (European Energy Exchange AG 2017). The EU ETS has not effectively encouraged companies to make strategic investments toward large-scale emissions reductions. The damages evaluated (Potter 1998) . Based on the contingent valuation method, the benefit of ESA was much larger than its cost (Stewart et al. 1997) . The CSS showed some additionality, mostly at the margin, based on interviews with landowners and field surveys (Carey et al. 2003) . Demonstrating real additionality, to be sure benefits are a result of the program alone, is difficult (Hanley et al. 1999 (Liu et al. 2008) . Having converted or afforested 21 million ha by 2006, the GTGP is the largest PES globally. Both programs have had positive impacts on the ecosystem services they addressed through the retirement and reforesting of large areas. Outcomes include reductions in soil erosion and improvements in carbon sequestration capacities (Liu et al. 2008; Bennet 2008 ). However, non-native species were planted, thus affecting native biodiversity (Liu et al. 2008) . Both programs have the potential for leakage. This refers to a situation where securing an ecosystem service in one location leads to the loss or degradation of ecosystem services elsewhere (OECD 2010). For example, although Chinese timber production decreased after the programs were established, timber imports increased in several years, potentially indicating leakage of timber production (Liu et al. 2008) .
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Volume 32, No. 5, 2018 (Echavarría et al. 2004 ). The level of payments is designed to cover the opportunity costs of the landowners. Additionality in terms of water quality could not be well assessed, but in comparison with neighboring areas, forest and grassland cover has increased greatly. However, agricultural profitability has also decreased, which may have contributed to lessening of the impact of land use (Wunder & Albán 2008) .
FONAG Water Fund
Ecuador 2000 forest, valleys hydrological services user-financed PES This is the oldest example of PES schemes financing the protection of hydrological services of natural forests and valleys with the help of a trust fund. The fund is managed by an independent advisory board that chooses areas to be restored in the 500,000 ha area around Quito. The fund is financed by water users through the water-utility company and used for restoration and training activities, often community projects. The water fund has successfully revegetated and reforested the area under its control and stopped or reduced threatening agricultural practices such as cattle grazing (Buytaert et al. 2006 ).
Payments for Hydrological Environmental
Services ( (Asquith et al. 2008) . Upstream landowners receive in-kind services and technical assistance. The scheme has 6 payment types, but the price is too low to engender real change . Mistrust between buyers and providers weakened program success. Nonthreatened areas became protected under the program because farmers select areas to protect that they would not have cleared anyway (Asquith et al. 2008) .
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Volume 32, No. 5, 2018 CBA, benefit transfer The construction of the power-generating Bala dam was initially proposed in the late 1990s. The Conservation Strategy Fund conducted a CBA, including social and environmental impacts of the project, the latter was valued using benefit transfer. In the course of construction >200,000 ha with globally important and high levels of biodiversity would have been flooded. Based on lowand high-cost scenarios, the analysis showed that the project would cause a net financial loss of >US$400 million. The project was cancelled (Reid 1999 CBA, benefit transfer A CBA was conducted to identify the best management option for the Thornton Creek watershed in Seattle, which is an area affected by frequent storm-water flooding. The watershed provides water for a 3,100 ha region with relatively high biodiversity for an urban area. Seattle Public Utilities engaged economists from Earth Economics to conduct a CBA to work out whether to replace a water-absorbing metal pipe by a confluence floodplain. Using their Ecosystem Service Valuation Toolkit, the team extrapolated primary valuations to the ecosystem services in the Thornton Creek watershed and examined the confluence floodplain to provide the most economic, social, and environmental benefits. Building the confluence floodplain was agreed to in 2014 (Schmidt & Wittich 2014 The state of Alaska conducted a contingent valuation study to assess the damage value in terms of what people would pay to avoid a similar catastrophe. The final sum of damage payments did not deviate much from the actual value proposed by the study. Exxon had to pay US$1 billion in restitution for resource damage to the state of Alaska and the U.S. government. Exxon spent more than US$2 billion for the restoration of the area (Carson et al. 2003) .
Prestige Oil spill Spain 2002 coastal area biodiversity, habitat, recreation contingent valuation, passive use value Over 1,500 km of shoreline and ecosystems were severely damaged, including in France and Portugal. Based on economic and contingent valuations, the total economic value of the loss due to the spill was €4.3 billion. The amount served as a reference point for courts to claim compensation payments (Loureiro et al. 2009 ). In 2016, the highest Spanish court agreed to a much lower payment (€1 billion) but obliged the insurance company of the tanker that caused the oil spill to compensate for all damages. This was the first court decision in Spain to consider passive-use values (Mueller & de Groot 2016) .
Chevron Texaco pollution Ecuador 2011
Amazonas Forest biodiversity, habitat, recreation variety of environmental damage valuation studies/ court decision for damage restoration A variety of valuation studies were conducted to determine the amount of the penalty payment to be made to compensate for Chevron-Texaco's pollution of the area. In 2011 the court ordered Chevron-Texaco to pay almost US$9 billion, which were used to restore the environmental damage and to build up cultural and health programs in affected communities (Kallis et al. 2013) . The payment did not represent the full value of the ecosystem losses and deaths but is being used to partly restore the damage, and it serves as a deterrent (Martinez-Alier 2011; Kallis et al. 2013 ). in the course of claiming compensation payments in the cases analyzed were also examples of aggregated valuation. For example, the damage caused by the Prestige oil spill was evaluated by aggregating losses in the entire area, including shorelines of three countries (Loureiro et al. 2009 ). In Costa Rica, the use of uniform payments for participating landowners was one of the program's shortcomings (Pagiola 2008) . The payments were too low to induce owners of threatened areas to cease their land use. In contrast, the inverse auctions undertaken in the Wimmera catchment program and the Northeim model project resulted in individual payment contracts (Bertke & Marggraf 2005; Shelton & Whitten 2005) . Payments in the Programa Face de Forestación (PROFAFOR) program (Table 2 ) and in the Vittel catchment area are negotiated individually (Perrot-Maître 2006; Wunder & Albán 2008) . The CBAs were used to evaluate ecosystem services at a rather local scale. For the spatial plan of the Belizean coastal zone, benefits were modeled separately for each of the nine planning regions (Arkema et al. 2015) .
Some PES schemes do not offer individually set payments; rather, the payment amount depends on the quality of the conserved area. Farmers receive higher payments for preservation of native biodiversity or landscapes, such as in the PES schemes for certain watersheds (Asquith et al. 2008; Wunder & Albán 2008) , the schemes in China, and the United Kingdom's Natural Forest Conservation Programme (NFCP) and Grain to Green (GTGP) (Dobbs & Pretty 2008; Liu et al. 2008) . For most case studies, the scale of change valued could not be identified with certainty. Most of the projects offered regionally differentiated valuations, but only a few of them include individual valuations on the local level.
Level of Threat
For all case studies, we found justification that the ecosystem monetized was somehow threatened or that it was close to a critical threshold, except in the case of the PROFAFOR PES scheme, for which no information about the state of the ecosystem was given (Wunder & Albán 2008) . In the case of compensation-payment cases, the evaluated damage degraded the ecosystems substantially and brought them close to this threshold or even beyond it. The CBA cases compared different management options with regard to several objectives, including the reduction of threats to which ecosystems are exposed.
In some cases the kind of threat to which ecosystems are exposed were considered explicitly, for example with direct and recent disturbances, such as regular flooding in China and the Thornton Creek watershed (Liu et al. 2008; Schmidt & Wittich 2014) . In some cases, endangered ecosystems or endangered species covered by the scheme were likely negatively affected without the implementation of certain conservation measures, for example the Belize Barrier Reef (which was recently added to the list of World Heritage Sites in Danger) and the Chinook salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha) in the Thornton Creek watershed (Schmidt & Wittich 2014) .
In the United Kingdom, where historic landscapes have been increasingly changed and adjusted to modern agricultural land use over the last decades (Dobbs & Pretty 2008) , there was no indication that this development urgently threatens ecosystems. In other cases, projects had been initiated to address threatened areas, but the payments offered appeared too low to induce landowners to participate or to stop their land use, such as in Los Negros, Bolivia (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008; Pagiola 2008) .
In 15 studies the provision of the respective ecosystem service was threatened, and in 6 the ecosystem was in a state far from the threshold but moving toward the threshold before the start of valuation. More often than not, ecosystem service valuation was used to protect threatened species, although often these schemes also included other ecosystem safeguards. In the case of compensation payments, the schemes were not used to prevent damage and therefore should be treated separately within the context of threat.
Ecosystem Uniqueness
Some of the ecosystems covered by the valuation projects are very rare, such as coral reefs along the coast of Belize, or serve as habitat for endangered species, such as the Thornton Creek watershed (Schmidt & Wittich 2014; Arkema et al. 2015) . One case study dealt with an ecosystem of global importance due to its capacity to provide carbon sequestration, namely pollution by Chevron Texaco of the Amazon forest (Martinez-Alier 2011).
Conditions for Monetization
Six case studies applied to ecosystems that were regionally unique but were not globally unique and not threatened . In these cases, therefore a monetization through ecosystem-service valuation may be appropriate. For example, the GTGP and the NFCP in China and the CSS in the United Kingdom can be assigned to level I in Fig. 1 , where valuation is appropriate without restrictions because the areas were not urgently threatened and the payments were at least differentiated depending on the country (Dobbs & Pretty 2008; Liu et al. 2008) .
Monetization was applied to threatened ecosystems, such as the coral reefs of Belize (Arkema et al. 2015) and watersheds and catchment areas, and nonlocal ecosystems, such as the EU ETS (EC 2016) . Their valuation should have been complemented with some other form of restrictions on the ecosystem covered by these schemes. Even though valuation without a minimum standard should not have been used in situations that could be
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Although financial practice contradicts theory when a range of valuation schemes are applied to threatened ecosystems, some cases we examined were embedded in a broader political strategy that included a kind of quantitative control element like a minimum standard (level II in Fig. 1 ). For example, PSAH in Mexico and PSA in Costa Rica were implemented as logging bans and PESs (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008; Pagiola 2008) . Furthermore, the Slug It Out project was introduced to comply with the drinking-water directive that restricts the concentration of pesticides in water (Anglian Water 2015) .
Most of the assessments did not define counterfactuals. Instead, they compared effects of development in the study area with effects in neighboring areas (Wunder & Albán 2008) . Few programs incorporated a detailed and systematic effort to formally quantify additionality, especially ex ante (Wunder & Albán 2008) . These programs are relatively new, so it was difficult to assess their longterm effectiveness (Dobbs & Pretty 2008; Liu et al. 2008) . For most ongoing programs, it was unclear what might happen when they eventually end and whether conservation or restoration would continue after payments stop (Bennet 2008; Wunder & Albán 2008) .
Discussion
Based on our findings, we propose certain directions for future research. New techniques need to be developed and incorporated in current valuation methods so their effectiveness can be assessed. These techniques should focus on short-and long-term impacts on the ecosystem and consider the relevant wider socioeconomic system, including critical issues such as additionality and equality (Kallis et al. 2013) . In several of the case studies, it was impossible to assess program effectiveness separate from other factors, which may have influenced effectiveness, such as other political instruments that had been implemented at the same time (Pagiola 2008) or other market mechanisms (Wunder & Albán 2008) .
We explored the type and effectiveness of different ecosystem-service valuations and compared them with theoretical understanding (Turner et al. 2003; Farley 2008) . In particular, we considered scale and uniqueness of an ecosystem and level of ecosystem threat as conditions that could indicate the appropriateness of application of monetization to ecosystem services. Monetization, if not used in conjunction with other conservation measures, should be used as a valuation method only when the ecosystem in question is of local extent, not unique, and not threatened. If one or two of these conditions is not met, then additional measures to protect the ecosystem should be implemented, such as minimum standards of water quality or further policy protection. If none of the conditions are met, ecosystem valuation is inappropriate.
In practice, the majority of the case studies included ecosystems that did not meet all three conditions. However, the case studies did include additional measures to protect the ecosystem in general. Therefore, determining the effectiveness of the particular implementation of monetization or valuation was difficult because outcomes could be attributed to both the implementation and the additional policy measures. In some cases the outcomes of the entire intervention were uncertain. The absence of ecosystem assessments prior to the launch of valuation or the absence of counterfactual information also made it difficult to evaluate impact. However, there was evidence that some practice has resulted in higher-quality ecosystems, in particular in watershed management.
Besides the problem of measuring effectiveness, uncertainty with regard to how close an ecosystem is to its threshold, or even the existence of the threshold, makes determination of when valuation is appropriate highly uncertain (Farley 2012) . Leopold (1993) argues that because one cannot know with certainty which parts of the ecosystem are essential, it is straight forward to treat everything as critical.
Ecosystem services valued for compensation payments would all fall into the left region (level III) of Fig. 1 ; therefore, monetary valuation would be judged as inappropriate because of the enormous scale and the severity of impacts, making it impossible to meaningfully value them. However, compensation payments may achieve additionality if they are used to restore environmental damages and if the risk of being charged a penalty fee deters companies from polluting the environment (Kallis et al. 2013) .
Although the framework we propose rules out ecosystem valuation when certain conditions are not met, monetization can be used to inform policy makers of ecosystem values they would have not otherwise considered and thus make them more likely to protect ecosystem services. In some cases, when the costs, for example of protecting an endangered species, clearly outweigh the benefits of protection for which counterfactuals cannot be assessed, protection of ecosystem services, regardless of monetary values, could be considered the actual counterfactual. In this case, the decision to protect or not protect the ecosystem service should not be based purely on a valuation of the costs and benefits.
Although some evidence exists that valuation can be effective in certain circumstances, this has rarely been the case in practice without additional policy measures to protect threatened ecosystems. Given this, we recommend the current push to rapidly expand valuation services and ecosystem evaluation, in particular through voluntary private-sector measures, is highly risky and should be considered with great care. At the very least, full and
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